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TITUS·

One of the most topical issues among both corporate practitioners
and state legislators during these past three years has concerned the
desirability of amending state corporation statutes to enable limita
tions on corporate directors' liability for breach of the duty of care. 1
• Yale University, B.A. 1962, LL.B 1968; Professor of Law, Western New England
College School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of
Donna Case-~ossato in the preparation of this article.
I. The extent of the interest is evident from the large number of articles and com
mentaries which have appeared. See, e.g., Block, Barton & Garfield, Advising Directors on
the D&O Insurance Crisis, 14 SEC. REG. L.J. 130 (1986); Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler,
Responses to the D&O Insurance Crisis, 19 REv. SEC. & CoMM. REG. 263 (December 24,
1986) [hereinafter Veasey I]; Hanks, State Legislative Responses to the Director Liability
Crisis, 20 REv. OF SEC. & COMM. REG. 23 (February II, 1987) [hereinafter Hanks, State
Legislative Responses]; Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with a
Three Legged Stool ofLimited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAW. 399
(1987) [hereinafter Veasey II]; Comment, Director Liability: Michigan's Response to Smith
v. Van Gorkom, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1039 (1987); Linsley, Statutory Limitations on Direc
tors' Liability in Delaware, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 529 (1987); King, Director Protection
Under Virginia Law, 20 REV. SEC. & COMM. REG. 129 (August, 1987); Hazen, Corporate
Directors' Accountability: The Race to the Bottom-The Second Lap, 66 N.C.L. REV. 171
(1987); Lee, Limiting Corporate Directors Liability: Delaware's Section 102 (b)(7) and the
Erosion of the Directors' Duty of Care, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 239 (1987); Note, The Limita
tion ofDirectors' Liability: A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 66 TEX. L. REV. 411 (1987)
[hereinafter Note, The Limitation of Directors' Liability]; Note, Corporate Directors-An
Endangered Species?, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 497; Note, Statutory Responses to Boordroom
Fears, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 749 [hereinafter Note, Statutory Responses]; Note, Stat
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Twenty-five or more states have effected some change to their respec
tive state corporation laws in this respect;2 many others have consid
ered, or will be considering, similar amendments. 3 These legislative
initiatives have been triggered principally by concern that corporations
were finding it difficult to attract and retain qualified directors and
because directors were exposed, with respect to transactions where one
or more shareholders might contend that the directors failed to exer
cise due care, to potential personal liability both disproportionately
large and rather unpredictable. While the enacted and proposed
amendments include a variety of elements, including provisions re
garding both the appropriate standard of conduct for directors4 and
utory and Non-Statutory Responses to the Director and Officer Liability Insurance Crisis, 63
IND. L.J. 181 (1987-88) [hereinafter Note, Statutory and Non-Statutory Responses]; Gelb,
Director Due Care Liability: An Assessment o/the New Statutes, 61 TEMP. L.Q. 13 (1988);
Hanks, Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability Limitation and
Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207 (1988).
2. Several states have amended their stock corporation laws to provide for the elimi
nation or limitation upon the liability of directors for breach of duty'of care. ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 10-004 (Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1983 & Supp.
1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1645 (West Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-171(b)(3)
(Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (West Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17
6002 (Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:24C(4) (West 1969 & Supp. 1988); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 13(b)(1.5) (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1988); MICH. COMPo LAWS
ANN. §§ 450.2209, 450.2541 (West Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.l11(4),
302A.251(4) (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347(4) (Vernon Supp.
1986); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 78.037(1) (Michie Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2
7(3) (West 1969 & Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-4-18.2 (Supp. 1988); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 402(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7(11)(Supp. 1988);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(0) (Anderson Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 1006(7) (West Supp. 1988); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42 § 8364 (purdon Supp. 1988);
R.1. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-48(6) (Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-2-58.8
(Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-12-102(b)(3) (1988); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 1302-7.06(B) (Vernon Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-7-3.1 (1988); VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (Supp. 1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.307 (West Supp. 1987); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 17-1-202(c) (Michie 1987).
3. Among the other states which have considered or may be considering some fur
ther revision of their corporation laws are Alabama, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois,
Maine, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oregon, and Washington. A list of the various bills intro
duced in the 1987 sessions of the legislatures in these states is on file in the office of the
Western New England Law Review.
4. Some states have specified in their corporation laws an expanded list of factors
which shall be considered by the Board of Directors in adopting or rejecting a particular
corporate action. Thus, for example, the Connecticut Stock Corporation Act now provides
as follows:
For purposes of [the sections relating to corporate combinations or acquisitions],
a director of a corporation which has a class of voting stock registered pursuant
to section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as the same has been or
hereafter may be amended from time to time, in addition to complying with the
provisions of [Section 33-313(d)], shall consider, in determining what he reason
ably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, (1) the long-term as
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the circumstances under which indemnification by the corporation
may be permitted, S the central feature often has been a statutory pro
vision enabling either a limitation on, or the elimination of, corporate
directors' liability for breach of the duty of care. It is these specific
legislative responses which are the principal focus of this commentary.
The analysis which follows includes five parts: first, a review of the
three principal statutory alternatives which have been enacted with
respect to limitation of directors' liability; second, the alternative ap
well as the short-tenn interests of the corporation, (2) the interests of the share
holders, long-tenn as well as short-tenn, including the possibility that those inter
ests may be best served by the continued independence of the corporation, (3) the
interests of the corporation's employees, customers, creditors and suppliers, and
(4) community and societal considerations including those of any community in
which any office or other facility of the corporation is located. A director may
also in his discretion consider any other factors he reasonably considers appropri
ate in determining what he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation. A person who perfonns his duties in accordance with this subsec
tion shall be deemed to have no liability by reason of being or having been a
director of the corporation.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (1988), as amended by 1988 Conn. Acts 350 (Reg.
Sess.). It is somewhat unclear just what legal effect was intended by this specification of
factors to be considered. On one hand, the revision notes that factors other than the inter
ests of shareholders, i.e. employees, customers, creditors, local community, shall be taken
into account in detennining what is in the best interests of the corporation. In addition, the
last sentence states that a person who "perfonns his duties in accordance with this subsec
tion shall be deemed to have no liability ...." Id. Yet, a director presumably still has to
show care and prudence in evaluating these considerations. Connecticut's approach fur
ther is novel in that the enumerated standards apparently apply only to publicly-held com
panies whose securities are registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. No
provision is made for the standards to be considered by directors of smaller, closely-held
corporations. For a thoughtful criticism of statutory standards which includes considera
tion of the interests of persons or groups other than shareholders, see Gilson, A Structural
Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 819, 848-65 (1981).
For examples of similar statutes, several of which expressly eliminate any liability on
the part of directors absent recklessness or gross negligence, see FLA. STAT. § 607.1645
(West Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (West Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 351.347(4) (Vernon Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(0) (Anderson SUpp.
1987); PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8364 (Purdon Supp. 1988); and WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.307 (West SUpp. 1987).
In general, these statutes apply only to individuals acting in the capacity of director,
and not to other corporation officials.
5. Several states have expanded the right of domestic corporations to indemnify di
rectors, officers, and other corporate agents. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-37-8 (West
Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:83(A) (West 1969 & Supp. 1988); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 722(c) (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-19(a) (Supp. 1987);
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8365(a) (Purdon SUpp. 1988); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art.
2.02-1 (Vernon Supp. 1988); WYo. STAT. § 17-1-105.1(a) (1988). For a good discussion of
the role and significance of expanded indemnification provisions, see Note, Statutory Re
sponses to Boardroom Fears, supra note 1, at 761-62.
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proach proposed by the ALI's Corporate Governance Project;6 third,
a discussion of the various arguments in support of some action to
limit or eliminate directors' liability; fourth, a consideration of some of
the problems or concerns which have been raised regarding these new
statutory alternatives; and finally, a concluding recommendation re
garding this observer's preferred course of action.
I.

PRINCIPAL STATUTORY ApPROACHES BEING UTILIZED

Three distinct statutory patterns addressing the problem of direc
tors' liability have emerged. The predominant approach (which, for
purposes of this article, we will refer to as the "Delaware approach")
has been amendment of the state corporation law to authorize a corpo
ration to adopt a specific amendment to its certificate of incorporation
to limit or eliminate directors' liability.' Under this approach, a cor
poration simply is authorized to amend its certificate of incorporation
6. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 7.17 at 25-26 (Tent. Draft No.7, April 10, 1987) [hereinafter Corporate Governance
Project, T.D. 7].
7. Section 102(b)(7) of title 8 of the Delaware Code provides as follows:
(b) In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate of
incorporation . . . the certificate of incorporation may also contain any or all of
the following matters:
(7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a direc
tor to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of
fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate
or limit the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of
loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in
good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of
law; (iii) under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the
director derived an improper personal benefit ....
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1983 & Supp. 1986). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2
171(b)(3) (Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6002 (Supp. 1987); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
156B, § 13(b)(1.5) (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1988); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN.
§§ 450.2209, 450.2541 (West Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.1I1(4),
302A.251(4) (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.037 (Michie Supp.
1988); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 14A:-2-7(3) (West 1969 & Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53
4-18.2 (Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7(11) (Supp. 1988); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit.
42, § 8364 (Purdon Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-12-102(b)(3) (1988); TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-7.06(B) (Vernon Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-7-3.1
(1988).
It may be noted that under the Delaware approach, the limitation or elimination of
personal liability applies only to a breach of the duty of care. A director still may be liable
for money damages regarding any breach of the duty of loyalty, e.g., with respect to corpo
rate transactions in which the director may have a material personal interest. While the
scope and significance of this exception is not considered further in this article, one can
refer to various other commentators for discussions of that subject. See, e.g., Linsley,
supra note I, at 535-68; Lee, supra note I, at 273; and Gelb, supra note 1, at 38-43.
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in the conventional manner-i.e., upon approval of both the board of
directors and the shareholders-to achieve the desired result. 8
A second approach, adopted to date by a much smaller number of
states (hereinafter the "Indiana approach"), is to amend the applicable
corporation law flatly to provide that, absent willful misconduct or
recklessness, corporate directors have no liability for any breach of a
duty of care. 9 In this instance, the limitation or elimination of liability
is automatically effective upon the enactment of the statutory change
without the necessity for any action by individual corporations or their
shareholders.
The third approach is that being pursued by Virginia-namely, to
specify a statutory cap on the maximum liability to which directors
(and officers) may be subject. IO Under the Virginia corporation law
amendments, a corporate official's maximum liability generally is the
greater of: (1) $100,000.00 or (2) the amount of cash compensation
received by the officer or director from the corporation during the
8. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1983 & Supp. 1986) and other statutes
referenced supra note 7.
9. The Indiana approach operates in mandatory fashion to relieve directors of liabil
ity, absent willful misconduct, as follows:
A director is not liable for any action taken as a director, or any failure to take
any action, unless:
(1) the director has breached or failed to perform the duties of the direc
tor's office in compliance with this section; and
(2) the breach or failure to perform constitutes willful misconduct or
recklessness.
IND. CoDE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (West Supp. 1988).
A variation on this approach is that followed by Connecticut where a director is'
deemed not liable if he or she considers the various standards set out in the revised corpora
tion law. See supra note 4 and discussion therein as to the effect of such language.
10. The charter options open to Virginia corporations are as follows:
A. In any proceeding brought by or in the right of a corporation or brought by
or on behalf of shareholders of the corporation, the damages assessed against an
officer or director arising out of a single transaction, occurrence or course of con
duct shall not exceed the lesser of:
1. The monetary amount ... specified in the articles of incorporation or, if
approved by the shareholders, in the bylaws as a limitation on ... the liability of
the officer or director; or
2. The greater of (i) $100,000 or (ii) the amount of cash compensation re
ceived by the officer or director from the corporation during the twelve months
immediately preceding the act or omission for which liability was imposed.
B. The liability of an officer or director shall not be limited as provided in this
section if the officer or director engaged in willful misconduct or a knowing viola
tion of the criminal law or of any federal or state securities law, including, with
out limitation, any claim of unlawful insider trading or manipulation of the
market for any security.
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (Supp. 1988). For a further discussion of these provisions,
see King, supra note 1, at 129.
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twelve months immediately preceding the act or omission for which
liability is imposed. I I This cap is effective as to Virginia corporations
without any further action by either a corporation's board of directors
or shareholders (although the amount of the cap can be reduced, but
not increased, by appropriate amendment of the corporation's charter
documents).
Each of these alternatives typically is proposed together with var
ious other corporation law revisions. Thus, a state interested in taking
action to protect directors not only might modify its corporation law
to permit a corporation to adopt the requisite amendment to its certifi
cate of incorporation limiting liability, but also might adopt provisions
which will broaden the scope of permissible indemnification or set
forth a wider range of standards and interests which the directors
properly may consider in taking action.12
The practical effect of all three of these approaches generally has
been to eliminate accountability by corporate directors for any mone
tary liability for breach of the duty of care. The Indiana approach
achieves this result directly, by amending the corporation law to bar
any director liability absent willful misconduct or recklessness. The
Delaware and Virginia statutory approaches theoretically leave room
for corporations to adopt amendments to their certificates of incorpo
ration providing a cap on the maximum liability of corporate officials,
thus retaining a minimal level of residual financial exposure for those
officials. However, most corporations which have put forth an amend
ment for shareholder consideration have proposed total elimination of
financial liability. 13
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (Supp. 1988). For text of this provision, see supra
note 10. The effect of the statutory provision is to cap outside directors' liability at
$100,000.00 while inside directors (i.e., corporate officers) can have a somewhat greater
financial exposure, depending upon the level of their annual compensation from the
corporation.
12. For a discussion of some factors appearing in recently enacted statutes to be
considered by directors in reaching corporate decisions, see supra notes 4 and 5 and accom
panying text.
13. The one notable exception which has come to the author's attention is Emhart
Corporation, a Virginia corporation which adopted a charter amendment limiting direc
tors' and officers' liability to $100,000.00. See EMHART CORPORATION, PROXY STATE
MENT 46-50, C-l to C-5 (March 24, 1988). Otherwise, the various corporations of which
the author is aware have sought charter amendments eliminating all monetary liability on
the part of directors for breach of the duty of care. See, e.g., the proxy statements of the
following publicly-held corporations: MDU RESOURCES GROUP, INC., PROXY STATE
MENT at 1-3, A-I (March 6, 1987) (Delaware corp.); RJR NABISCO, PROXY STATEMENT
12-16, A-I, B-1 (March 19, 1987) (Delaware corp.); HARTFORD NATIONAL CORPORA
TION, PROXY STATEMENT 21-23,25 (April 15, 1987) (Delaware corp.); OKLAHOMA GAS
AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, PROXY STATEMENT 15-25, A-I to A-4 (April 4, 1988)
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THE ALI ApPROACH

The Corporate Governance Project's proposed legislative solution
differs from the three statutory approaches noted above in that the
former is premised on the assumption that, "as a matter of public pol
icy, some residual prospect of liability for due care violations should
be retained." 14 Under the Corporate Governance Project approach set
forth in its proposed section 7.17, the potential for financial liability
could be reduced, but never eliminated.
That section would measure a corporate official's maximum lia
bility for a violation of the duty of care generally by the compensation
received by the particular director or officer for serving the corpora
tion during the year of the alleged violation. IS While certain more
(Oklahoma corp.); FLEET/NORSfAR FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., PROXY STATEMENT 23-27,
B-1, C-l (April 7, 1988) (Rhode Island corp.); and SARA LEE CORPORATION, PROXY
STATEMEIIo'T 15-17 (September 22, 1988) (Maryland corp.). (All of the above proxy state
ments are on file at the office of the Western New England Law Review.) See also Note, The
Limitation of Directors' Liability, supra note 1, at 446 n.187.
While directors thus may be relieved of exposure to monetary liability, their perform
ance of duties nevertheless may be influenced by other non-monetary factors, e.g. public
disclosure requirements, their own perceptions (particularly in the case of outside directors)
of their responsibilities, the accountability imposed on corporate managers by market
mechanisms, and the like. See Corporate Governance Project, T.D. 7, supra note 6, at 34.
14. Corporate Governance Project, T.D. 7, supra note 6, at 28.
15. The proposed section provides as follows:
§ 7.17 Limitation on Damages for Certain Violations of the Duty of Care
(a) If a failure by a director [§ 1.08] or an officer [§ 1.22] to meet the stan
dard of conduct specified in § 4.01 did not
(1) involve a knowing and culpable violation oflaw by the director or
officer; or
(2) enable the director or officer, or an associate [§ 1.02], to receive a
benefit that was improper under Part V; or
(3) show a conscious disregard for the duty of the director or officer to
the corporation under circumstances in which the director or officer was
aware that his conduct or omission created an unjustified risk of serious in
jury to the corporation; or
(4) constitute a sustained and unexcused pattern of inattention that
amounted to an abdication of the defendant's duty to the corporation, dam
ages for the violation should be limited to an amount that is not dispropor
tionate to the compensation received by the director or officer for serving the
corporation during the year of the violation.
(b) A limitation on damages complying with § 7.17(a) may be implemented
by
(1) an enabling statute that authorizes the inclusion of a limitation on
damages in a corporation's certificate of incorporation; or
(2) a provision in a certificate of incorporation that is adopted by a
vote of disinterested shareholders [§ 1.11] after appropriate disclosure con
cerning the provision.
(c) Any limitation on damages set forth in the corporation's certificate of
incorporation
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egregious violations of the duty of care still would be subject to full
financial liability for whatever damages proximately flowed from those
violations,16 under section 7.17 as proposed, most violations would re
quire no more than restitution by the corporate official of the compen
sation earned for services to the corporation during the period in
question. 17
The position reflected in the Corporate Governance Project draft
obviously is a middle ground between the traditional tort liability prin
ciple of full liability for whatever damages proximately flow from a
breach of duty and the contract principle that shareholders should be
free to adopt whatever rules shall be applicable to their corporation
(including even an elimination of all liability for breaches of duty).
While accepting many of the considerations discussed in the following
section which support limitation ofliability, 18 the draft commentary to
section 7.17 borrows a concept from the Uniform Commercial Code to
justify its rejection of a pure "freedom of contract" view which would
legitimize the elimination of all liability. The commentary notes that
section "7.17 is premised on the belief that there should be a minimum
boundary in order that the risk of liability not be so low that the duty
of care, as expressed in [section] 4.01, 'fail of its essential purpose,' "19
i.e., to assure that corporate officials generally do act on behalf of the
corporation in an appropriate manner. Section 7.17 thus implicitly
rejects the argument that corporate officials should be subject to no
financial liability because injunctive and other non-monetary remedies
still available to shareholders will assure appropriate conduct by those
officials. 20

(1) should require ratification by shareholder vote at periodic intervals
and, in the case of a provision not expressly authorized by statute, be subject
to repeal by shareholders at the annual meeting; and
(2) should not reduce liability with respect to pending actions or losses
incurred prior to its adoption.
Corporate Governance Project, T.O. 7, supra note 6, at 25-26.
While the ALI alternative measures a corporate official's maximum potential liability
in a manner similar to the Virginia approach, it differs from the latter in that it mandates
that minimum level ofliability. Under the Virginia approach, on the other hand, the share
holders could vote to adopt a charter amendment providing for no monetary exposure.
See supra note 10.
16. See id. § 7. 17(a)(I)-(4).
17. Corporate Governance Project, T.O. 7, supra note 6, at 38-39, 59-61.
18. See infra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
19. Corporate. Governance Project, T.O. 7, supra note 6,.at 31. See a/so id. at 37-38.
20. Id. at 32-33.
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PRINCIPAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING To THE NEED FOR
LIMITATION ON LIABILITY

How is it that the statutory approaches referenced at the outset
have come to command so much interest and attention? A variety of
factors have stirred the consciousness of corporate practitioners and
legislators. These include difficulties faced by corporations in at
tracting and retaining qualified directors, increased costs of obtaining
appropriate insurance coverage for corporate officials, potential chil
ling of entrepreneurial behavior, and the perceived need by individual
states to keep their corporation laws competitive. with those in other
jurisdictions.
'
The factor cited most often in support of legislation limiting or
eliminating monetary liability for directors has ,been the claim that
corporations have found it increasingly difficult to attract and/or re
tain qualified directors, due to the potential liability exposure such in
dividuals otherwise face. 21 This claim actually can be broken down
further into two related issues-first, that various'state court decisions
interpreting directors' duty of care have increased the financial risks
for individuals who serve as directors, particularly outside directors
who have a very limited financial stake in the corporation; and second,
that director and officer insurance coverage ("D & 0 insurance") has
become ,prohibitively expensive and, in some cases, unavailable. 22
While there appears to be little hard data to indicate whether more
corporate officials actually are being found liable for breach of the
21. Baum, The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. WK. Sept. 8; 1986, at 56; Lerner & Burke,
Protecting Directors in Tender Offer Contests and Leveraged BU)lO.uts, in DIRECTORS' AND
OFFICERS' LIABILITY AND THE INSURANCE CRISIS 232 (Georgetown University Law
Center compo 1987) (material on file at the office of the Western New England Law Review);
TOUCHE Ross, ISSUES FACING U.S. CoRPORATE DIRECTORS 2, 5 (Dec. 1986) (over one
third of 1,100 directors of publicly-held corporations surveyed indicated they had consid
ered resignation due to increased liabilities to which exposed (on file at the office of the
Western New England Law Review». One commentator identifies at least seventeen pub
licly-held companies who specifically suffered director resignations. See Hanks, State Leg
islative Responses, supra note I, at 24 n.6. See also Note, The Limitation of Directors'
Liability, supra note I, at 413;
22. Block, supra note I, at 131 n.5; Baum, supra note 21, at 56; Lewin, Director
Insurance Drying Up, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7,1986, at Dl, col. 2; Ipsen, The Crisis in Directors
and Officers Insurance, 19 INST. INVESTORS 231 (Aug. 1985); Hilder, Risky Business: Lia
bility Insurance is Difficult to Find Now for Directors. Officers, Wall St. J., July 10, 1985, at
1; Foley, Insurance Against Director & Officer Liability, in DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS'
LIABILITY AND THE INSURANCE CRISIS 8-5 to 8-6 (Georgetown University Law Center
compo 1987) (showing a decline in available coverage for D & 0 carriers from $347 million
at January I, 1984, to $110 million at November I, 1986); Boundas, Negotiating the D&O
Insurance Contract, in DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY AND THE INSURANCE CRI
SIS 320-24 (Georgetown University Law Center compo 1987).
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duty of care via shareholder derivative actions than in the past, there is
no question that the number of such lawsuits filed has increased dra
. maticall y23 and that the average expenses involved in defending those
lawsuits also have increased significantly.24 In addition, there clearly
was a period from 1984 through 1987 during which the premium
charges for D & 0 insurance escalated very rapidly.25 The net effect
of these developments has been to generate myriad reports of either
individuals choosing to resign as directors when adequate coverage
could not be obtained or of corporations having difficulty recruiting
qualified individuals willing to serve as directors. 26
The principal factor resulting in these consequences, arising in the
recent era of large mergers and acquisitions, is the potential for dispro
portionately large and somewhat unpredictable damages theoretically
being attributable to directors' failure to observe due care. While the
nature of directors' functions and responsibilities may not be much
different from what shareholders expected of them fifteen or twenty
years ago, the magnitude of the transactions on which directors must
pass has changed dramatically. In the 1960s, for example, a share
holder might have challenged a board of directors' decision not to un
dertake a particular business opportunity which allegedly deprived the
corporation of the opportunity to earn several hundred thousand dol
lars a year.27 In the celebrated recent Smith v. Van Gorkom case,28 on
23. Stone, Aetna Offers Added Protection to Corporate Directors, Hartford Courant,
Feb. 24, 1988, at F-l (from 1970 to 1985, number of lawsuits seeking more than $1 million
in damages from corporate officers and directors increased from 2 to in excess of 500).

24. Id.
25. In some instances, premium increases were as high as 1,000 %. Boundas, supra
note 22, at 320.
26. While the indemnification statutes in most states are intended to enable reim
bursement to directors or officers of expenses associated with defending a lawsuit, those
provisions sometimes will offer no help, either because the corporate official does not meet
the standards of conduct set forth in the statute or because the corporation may be finan
cially unable or unwilling (e.g., due to a change in corporate control) to provide the re
quested indemnification. Olson, The D & 0 Insurance Gap: Strategies for Coping, Legal
Times, Mar. 3, 1986, at 25, col. 1; Note, Statutory and Non-Statutory Responses, supra note
1, at 192-93.
Similarly, D & 0 insurance coverage, even though authorized by most statutes, may
be limited due to prohibitive cost, see supra note 25, or because of specific exclusions or
deductibles provided in the particular D & 0 policy. See, e.g., Johnston & Gassman, Direc
tors and Officers Liability Insurance-The Standard Insurance Contract, in DIRECTORS'
AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY AND THE INSURANCE CRISIS 292-97 (Georgetown University
Law Center compo 1987).
27. See, for example, the celebrated derivative action brought in the case ofShlensky
V. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968), which probably involved a-damage
claim of less than $1 million. While the plaintiff alleged that the failure to install lights (in
order to enable night baseball games) resulted in the loss of substantial additional, revenues,
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the other hand, the damages allegedly attributable to the directors'
failure to sufficiently inquire regarding the acquisition proposed by
their chief executive officer probably were in the vicinity of
$65,000,000.00; the eventual settlement in that case was approxi
mately $23,500,000.00. 29
A more fundamental argument put forward by proponents of one
or more of the foregoing statutory alternatives is that the mere exist
ence of potential liability for a director seriously discourages en
trepreneurial decisiveness. To put it another way, faced with any
possibility of personal financial liability as a result of shareholder liti
gation, directors will be reluctant to authorize or engage in corporate
transactions perceived to involve more than ordinary risk. 30 Classic
economic doctrine holds that the greatest potential for reward usually
the record indicated that the plaintiff was unable to show that the increased revenues would
be sufficient to cure the losses tlien being suffered by the corporation. Id. at 182, 237
N.E.2d at 781.
28. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). In that case, Van Gorkom, the
chief executive officer of Trans Union Corporation, negotiated an agreement for the sale of
the corporation via a merger to the Pritzker family at the price of $55.00 per share. The
Delaware Supreme Court found that the Board of Directors did not reach an informed
business judgment in approving that transaction. Specifically, the court found that the
directors (1) did not adequately inform themselves as to Van Gorkom's role in initiating the
transaction and establishing the per share purchase price; (2) did not obtain sufficient infor
mation to enable them to reach an informed judgment on the fairness of the $55.00 per
share price; and (3) failed to act with informed reasonable deliberation in approving the
Pritzker merger proposal. Id. at 874-80.
29. The case actually was remanded for a determination ofthe actual damages, to be
measured by the difference between the fair market value of the Trans Union shares and the
merger transaction price of $55.00 per share. Id. at 893. Assuming that the fair market
value was at least $60.00 per share (a value within the range suggested by the chief financial
officer's internal projections, id. at 867), the directors' aggregate liability would have ap
proached $66 million, based upon the 13,357,758 shares outstanding at the time. Id. at 864
n.3.
The litigation subsequently was settled, apparently for a total of $23.5 million, $10
million of which came from the D & 0 insurance carrier (that amount being the policy
limit) and the balance from the acquirer. Block, supra note 1, at 136 n.28.
30. The commentary to section 7.17 of the Corporate Governance Project analyzes
this consideration in the following manner:
[E]conomic logic suggests that a ceiling [on financial liability] would reduce
the pressures on directors to act in an unduly risk-averse manner. Realistically,
the risk of liability for due care violations tends to be one-sided: directors can be
held liable for excessively risky acts or decisions, but not, as a practical matter,
for excessively cautious ones. Given the frequently nominal investment of direc
tors in their corporation's stock, a substantial risk of liability for negligence might
lead risk-averse directors to opt for more hesitant policies than shareholders de
sire (particularly to the extent that shareholders hold reasonably diversified port
folios and so are substantially protected against any firm-specific risk)....
Corporate Governance Project, T.D. 7, supra note 6, at 31.
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lies with those business decisions involving greater risk. 31 Thus, if cor
porate officials are chilled from undertaking corporate transactions
posing greater risk because of potential shareholder derivative action,
the corporation and its shareholders, having foregone those business
endeavors with the greatest profit potential, will be the losers in the
long run. A related concern shared by many corporate practitioners is
that the protection historically available to directors making decisions
involving investment and business· risks under the so-called business
judgment rule also has been eroded significantly.32.
Finally, some corporate practitioners and state officials urge the
adoption of one of these alternatives merely to keep their state compet
itive with other state jurisdictions which already have done so. The
concern expressed is that corporations presently domiciled in their
states may elect to reincorporate in a state which has adopted more
protective provisions for its domestic corporations. 33 .
How valid are all these concerns? It certainly is true that some
corporations have found it somewhat more difficult to locate persons
to serve as directors. 34 However, whether this is solely or even princi
pally attributable to the increased liability risks perceived to be associ
ated with such service is open to question. There is some evidence that
directors' changing perceptions of their functions and responsibilities
have increased the time commitment that those persons feel is re
quired, with the result that any given individual accepts fewer direc
torship positions than in the past. 35 Similarly, while D & 0 premiums
have increased significantly, it is not clear what factors actually are
most responsible for those increases-a greater frequency of share
holder derivative actions, increased legal costs of defense, monetarily
higher jUdgments, or poor actuarial judgments in earlier times. 36 In
31. See, e.g., KLEIN & COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 42 (Foun~
dation Press, 3d ed. 1988); GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISI
TIONS 85 (Foundation Press, 1986).
32. See, e.g., Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40
Bus. LAW. 1437 (1985); Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom
After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1 (1985); Note, Smith v. Van Gorkom: A Narrow Inter
pretation o/the Business Judgment Rule, 15 CAP. V.L. REV. 725 (1986).
33. Testimony offered before the state legislatures invariably includes reference to
the necessity to retain domestic corporations and the jobs for which tI;lOse corporations
account. See, e.g., Woodward, How Much Indiana's Anti-Takeover Law Cost Shareholders,
Wall St. J., May 5, 1988, at 32, col. 8; Murphy, Dread 0/ Hostile Takeovers Leads to Com
promise Legislation This Session, Hartford Courant, May 10, 1988 at Cl, col. 1.
34. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
35. Melloan, A Good Director is Getting Harder to Find; Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1988, 'at
39, col. 3.
36. Boundas, supra note 22, at 320-24; Lee, supra note I, at 254 nn.73 & 74..
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any event, notwithstanding the recent escalation in premium costs, ad
equate liability coverage generally appears to be available presently for
most corporations and their officers and directors. 37
The claim that entrepreneurial decision-making will be unduly
discouraged assumes that the corporation law, both as written and as
interpreted by the courts, leaves corporate officials without any mean
ingful protection with respect to corporate decisions involving risk.
That proposition, like the Player Queen in Hamlet, "doth protest too
much."38 The generally prevailing statutory or case law standards for
director action-that directors should act in good faith and in the best
interests of the corporation with the care of a reasonable person in like
circumstances39--do not themselves prohibit transactions which may
involve both greater risk and greater reward potential. 40 Moreover,
the burden of proving that the directors' approval of a particular
transaction was not in the best interests of the corporation falls on the
challenging shareholder. 41 Most importantly, the business judgment
rule, in fact, remains intact, i.e., that directors' evaluations of the busi
ness aspects of a particular transaction, including the potential risks
and rewards, will not be second-guessed by a court, absent any impli
cations of self-dealing or conflicts of interest on the part of the direc
tors. 42 None of the celebrated cases often referenced by practitioners
actually threaten that basic doctrine. Smith v. Van Gorkom, for exam
37.
38.
menting
39.
follows:

Boundas, supra note 22, at 320-24.
W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET 129 (Bell Pub. Co., Inc. 1958) (Lady Gertrude com
on the comments of the Player Queen).
The duty of care is spelled out in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act as .

[A] director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a
member of a committee: (1) in good faith; (2) with the care an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in a
manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1984).
40. The language referring to a director "in a like position" and "under similar cir
cumstances" was intended to recognize that certain transactions may involve greater risks
and that the nature and extent of the director's responsibilities thus may vary. Id., official
comment at 222. See also The Corporate Director's Guidebook, 32 Bus. LAW. 5, 15 (1976).
41. Schwartz & Bauman, The Developing Business Judgment Rule, Georgetown Con
ference, supra note 21, at 1, 20. See also Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch.
1971); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); HENN & ALEXANDER, LAWS OF
CoRPORATIONS § 234, at 625 (3d ed. 1983). Section 4.01(d) of the Corporate Governance
Project expressly adopts that position: "A person challenging the conduct of a director or
officer under this Section has the burden of proving a breach of duty of care . . . and the
burden of proving that the breach was the legal cause of damage suffered by the corpora
tion.". Tentative Draft 4 § 4.Ol(d) (1985).
42. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; Bodell v. General Gas & Elec. Corp., 140 A.
264, 267 (Del. 1927).
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pIe, is not a holding which authorizes a court to second-guess a consid
ered decision by the board of directors; it rather is only a finding that
the process for reviewing, questioning, and evaluating a proposed
transaction must bring all the relevant information before the directors
so that they can make an appropriate decision. 43 While one thus can
conclude that directors need not be chilled in their decision-making
regarding transactions involving greater risks, that does not necessar
ily remove the issue. To the extent that persons serving as directors
perceive, even if incorrectly, that their decisions may be second
guessed and liability imposed, they still may act in a risk-aversive
manner. Fortunately, as will be noted shortly, that possible effect can
be minimized, if not substantially eliminated, by providing a defined
limit as to those directors' liability which, as a result of D & 0 insur
ance and otherwise, they may be willing to bear.
Leaving aside marginal tax revenues which possibly may be gen
erated from a corporation which is domestically incorporated as op
posed to one present only as a foreign corporation, it also is difficult to
articulate any sound public policy reasons why states should compete
to have the least restrictive or most relaxed corporate law require
ments. In the first instance, it is a competition that cannot be finally
or conclusively won. Thus, for example, even were the Connecticut or
Massachusetts legislatures to decide to make their corporation laws
more permissive, nothing precludes Delaware, Indiana, or some other
state from enacting even more permissive legislation. Assuming that
in such a "race to the bottom,"44 some state reaches the bottom, what
will be the quality of the law? Most likely, it will be a law which
affords no significant protections to either the shareholders, creditors,
or employees of the corporation. Secondly, there actually are very few
(albeit that those few are large and quite influential) corporations
domiciled in any given state which seriously would consider
reincorporation in another jurisdiction due to the then prevailing cor
poration law statutes. 45
43. Smith, 488 A.2d at 889-93.
44. For a discussion of some of the implications of a "race to the bottom," see Ha
zen, supra note I, at 181-82; Macey & Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Dela
ware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987); Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom"
Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw.
U.L. REV. 913 (1982); Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law
of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861 (1969).
45. Since most corporate entities doing busi'ness in a particular state are subject to
service of process, taxation, and corporate filing obligations whether or not domiciled in the
state, they generally will find that the benefits of incorporating in a different jurisdiction do
not outweigh the costs of doing so. A large corporation with operations and facilities in
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Stripping away these layers leaves the common core argument
traditionally advanced to legislators for both relaxed corporate law
standards and more protective anti-takeover legislation-the need to
preserve local jobs. While the preservation of local jobs obviously is
an effective argument with which to obtain a legislator's attention, it
simply is a false one-a red herring. Rarely have corporate law stan
dards or requirements prevailing in a particular state had any impact
upon plant or business openings or c1osings. 46
Indeed, of all the concerns discussed above, the one which has the
most significant basis in fact is the contention that, with the sheer
magnitUde of many corporate transactions effected in modern times, a
corporation and its directors and officers can be subject to unpredict
able and unreasonably disproportionate liability. In that circum
stance, as the commentary to the Corporate Governance Project's
section 7.17 states, "the traditional principle of law that persons are
normally liable for· all damages that their actions cause collides with
the policy considerations that support a ceiling on financialliabil
ity."47 In attempting to set out a framework within which to fashion a
revised statutory scheme, the Corporate Governance Project identifies
the following policy reasons which have relevance to the concern over
unpredictable and possibly excessive exposure to financial liability:
First and most fundamentally, a ceiling is justified on grounds of
fairness, because the potential liability in cases where the ceiling
could apply would otherwise be excessive in relation to the nature of
the defendant's culpability and the economic benefits expected from
serving the corporation. Second, economic logic suggests that a
ceiling would reduce the pressures on directors to act in an unduly
risk-averse manner.... [Third], such a limitation may serve to re
duce the cost of insurance (often bome by the corporation) because
the likely exposure of the insurer is reduced. Although the threat of
derivative litigation is only one of the determinants of the cost of
0&0 insurance, which may be more affected by the threat of other
liabilities (e.g., securities law liabilities, actions by a bankruptcy
several states, on the other hand, may not be troubled by the incremental costs or require
ments associated with incorporation in a different jurisdiction. The net result is that incor
poration in a jurisdiction different from where the corporation has its facilities is likely to
be considered only by the few large, publicly-held corporations in any given jurisdiction.
46. The limited data available regarding hostile takeovers do not support a conclu
sion that more often than not the acquiring company will close several of the acquired
company's facilities or layoff substantial numbers of workers. See Tuerck, The Fallacy 0/
Laws That Stop Takeovers, Boston Globe, Feb. 23, 1988, at 48, col. 3; Woodward, supra
note 33.
47. Corporate Governance Project, T.D. 7, supra note 6, at 30.
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trustee, and· direct federal 'environmental and anti-discrimination
actions), a limitation on due care liability at least contributes to cost
reduction and also protects the defendant from the danger that his
insurance coverage may be inadequate or that an exception to its
coverage may be applicable to his case. . .. [Fourth], it is likely that
the duty of care will be implemented by courts more evenly and
appropriately when the potential penalties that may result are not
perceived as Draconian. 48

Assuming that justification thus exists for pursuing modification
of the rules imposing liability on directors,· we also need to consider
what. other problems and COncerns may arise when we do so.
IV.

PROBLEMS POSED

By

ELIMINATION OF ALL FINANCIAL

LIABILITY

Perhaps the most fundamental COncern posed is the question of
the effect on shareholder remedies were directors freed from all finan
cial accountability for breach of the duty of care. What protectionS or
assurances, if any, will shareholders then have that directors will treat
48. Id. at 31-32. It is interesting to note that the reasons urged by Emhart Corpora
tion when it sought shareholder approval of a charter amendment limiting directors' and
officers' liability to $100,000.00 are to a similar effect:
The Board of Directors believes that the adoption of the Proposed Article is in
the best interests of the stockholders as well as the Corporation. In recent years,
there has been an increase in the number and amount of claims brought against
directors and officers of corporations. At' the same time, the general availability
of adequate directors' and officers' liability insurance coverage has been reduced
and the cost of the available insurance has escalated dramatically. As a result,
certain corporations have experienced significant difficulties in attracting· and re
taining qualified persons to serve on their boards of directors. In addition, those
who do serve may be inhibited by the unavailability of insurance from making
business decisions that are in the best interests of the corporation. The Board of
Directors has concluded that it is advisabie to provide directors and officers with
broad protection under the Act (including limiting liability for monetary damages
to $100,(00) in order to continue to attract and retain capable individuals to serve
the Corporation. Further, even without" regard to insurance considerations, if the
Proposed Article is adopted; the Board believes 'it will be able more freely to
exercise its business judgment because the Proposeq Article will reduce the con
cern as to potential litigation with respect to decisions that the Board must make
affecting the future of the' Corporation. Finally, the cost of directors' and officers'
liability insurance has increased substantially iii' recent years. The Corporation
has historically carried such insurance although it has 'no legal obligation to do
so. Although there can be no assurance thatthe adoption of.the Proposed Article
will enable 'the Corporation more readily to secure directors' and officers' liability· .
insurance at a lower cost, the Board of Directors believes that the Proposed Arti
cle may have a favorable impact over the long term on the availability, cost,
amount and scope of such insurance coverage.. '..
EMHART CORPORATION, PROXY STATEMENT 48-49 (March' 24, 1988)..
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their interests as significant, let alone paramount? Several responses
have been offered. Thus, for example, shareholders theoretically still
can bring actions seeking to enjoin a particular corporate transaction
as unfair or not in the corporation's best interests. 49 Yet, how likely
are such actions to succeed (let alone be attempted) in light of both the
business judgment rule and the lack of any incentive among the "pri
vate attorney generals" to pursue shareholder litigation?50
Alternatively, unhappy shareholders presumably can initiate a
proxy contest to replace directors with whom they are dissatisfied. 51
However, the disadvantages confronting would-be challengers, not the
least of which is the staggering expense involved, coupled with the
uncertainty of the recovery thereof, are many.52 Not to worry, re
spond the defenders of liability limitations, unhappy shareholders can
register their disapproval by exercising the Wall Street option, by sell
ing their shares. 53 If there were some credible body of evidence sug
gesting that such actions really have a significant influence on director
and officer behavior, one might be willing to accept such a market
approach. That evidence is lacking.54 Moreover, why should a share
49. Since the Delaware statutory provision and others like it speak only of the elimi
nation of monetary damages or financial liability, injunctive remedies remain available to
shareholders troubled by an alleged directors' failure to use appropriate care in acting upon
a particular transaction. For text of Delaware statute, see supra note 7. See also Veasey I,
supra note 1, at 268 (duty of care has "vitality in remedial contexts other than personal
monetary damages"); Hanks, supra note 1, at 25; and Comment, supra note 1, at 1062.
50. See supra notes 41 and 42 and accompanying text; see also Corporate Govern
ance Project, T.D. 7, supra note 6, at 32-33.
51. Under the Securities and Exchange Commission's proxy rules, an unhappy
shareholder group can solicit proxies to elect their own slate of candidates to replace the
incumbents with whom they are dissatisfied. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240. 14a-6, 14a-7, 14a-9
(1988).
52. It is not unusual in proxy contests involving large publicly-held corporations for
the expenses to involve millions of dollars. Thus, for example, in the recent proxy contest
between Carl Icahn and the incumbent management of Texaco, the former spent between
$5 and $7 million (and the latter presumably more). Wall St. J., June 20, 1988 at 3, col. 1.
In a similar vein, the management of Gillette Co. reported that it set aside at least $9
million in the first six months of 1988 in connection with the proxy contest and litigation in
which it was engaged with The Coniston Partners. Boston Globe, July 23, 1988, at 12, col.
4. In addition, absent a result other than full success, insurgents may be unable to obtain
any reimbursement for the expenses incurred. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine and
Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955).
53. J. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 60-61, 66-67 (1958). See also
Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 779 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that, if all other remedies
fail, unhappy shareholders "can sell or trade their stock in the offending corporation in
favor of an enterprise more compatible with their own personal goals and values"), cerro
denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982).
54. While corporate managements clearly undertake considerable communication
and solicitation with at least the large institutional investors who are current shareholders
of a corporation (to obtain their support of either the incumbent directors or pending man
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holder be forced to abandon his property interest in the corporation in
order to influence those responsible for directing its affairs?
In addition, even if one were to accept that directors should be
held harmless from financial liability in some circumstances, why
should not that decision, at a minimum, require an informed determi
nation by shareholders to do so? If shareholders are to part with the
right to hold directors accountable for the latters' failure to exercise
due care, it should be by an informed and conscious decision-making
process. 55 The Indiana approach seems particularly repugnant be
cause it achieves an elimination of potential director liability without
the shareholders of such a domestic corporation having any say or
voice. 56 Similarly, to permit corporate practitioners to insert liability
elimination provisions in a certificate of incorporation at the time of
formation deprives the future shareholders of that entity from ever
considering the choice. The only justifiable approach, whatever limi
tation of director liability provisions is considered, is to require, first,
that those provisions be adopted by affirmative vote of the outstanding
shareholders after full and adequate disclosure and, second, that such
limitations be periodically reexamined. 51 Approval by shareholders
should be recognized only if the process by which the approval is
sought allows for both meaningful articulation of the issues and oppor
tunity for careful reflection.
Another issue yet to be addressed in any of the analysis and dis
cussion of the various statutory approaches concerns the appropriate
ness of applying liability limitation provisions in the context of closely
held corporations which, after all, constitute the overwhelming
number of corporations domiciled in a particular state. 58 There are
agement proposals), there is little evidence that management is materially influenced by the
sale or disposition of shares by such a shareholder.
55. The commentary to the Corporate Governance Project's T.D. 7 raises the issue
of how meaningful is shareholder approval of charter amendments limiting or eliminating
director liability:
Given the typical shareholder's lack of awareness of the corporate charter,
amendments that frustrate legitimate shareholder expectations may fairly be
characterized as contracts of adhesion [i.e., lacking of any opportunity for mean
ingful bargaining or consent]. . . . As a substitute for actual bargaining,
§ 7.17(c)(I) specifies a "sunset" provision that requires periodic renewal by
shareholders.
Corporate Governance Project, T.D. 7, supra note 6, at 41-42.
56. For text and discussion of Indiana statute, see supra note 9 and accompanying
text.
57. Corporate Governance Project, T.D. 7, supra note 6, at 41-43.
58. There are in excess of 3,000,000 corporations in the United States filing corporate
tax returns. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1987 at 503, Table 852. Yet only 12,000 to 13,000 of those are publicly traded,
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three characteristics of a closely-held corporation which should cause
us to consider their situation specially. In the first instance, there is a
much greater likelihood that there will be substantial identity between
the directors and shareholders of the corporation, i.e., the principal
shareholders also will serve as directors~ S9 The separate functions and
responsibilities usually exercised by persons in those different capaci
ties may well become blurred and indistinguishable. Actions ordina
rily performed by the directors may be undertaken by the shareholders
or they simply may be undertaken without regard as to the capacity in
which the individuals intended to act. 60
The basic relationship between the participants in a closely-held
corporation also is likely to be different from the relationship between
directors and shareholders of a large enterprise. In the former, the
relationship may be both perceived and conducted more in the nature
of a partnership, with higher expectations and trust regarding the con
duct of one another.61 In the latter, there may well be a separation of
ownership and control. Moreover, should the relationship turn out
less favorably than anticipated, e.g., a particular shareholder's expec
tations simply are not met, there is far less opportunity for the un
happy shareholder in the closely-held corporation to liquidate his
holdings and seek an alternative investment. 62 Means for resale of the
shareholder's interest may be severely limited; there is no comparable
Wall Street option available as is the case at least for larger corpora
tions whose shares are publicly traded. 63
V.

A MORE BALANCED ApPROACH

The discussion in Part III above certainly suggests that some ac
tion needs to be taken to address the threat of staggering recoveries
against directors of publicly-held companies for breach of the duty of
care. On the other hand, the immediately preceding section identifies,
i.e., with more than 500 shareholders of record and securities registered under § 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DIRECTORY OF
COMPANIES REQUIRED TO FILE ANNUAL REPORTS WITH THE SECURITIES AND Ex
CHANGE COMMISSIONER (1986).
59. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16,203 N.E.2d 577 (1965); Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
60. Thus, for example, § 8.0l(c) ofthe Revised Model Business Corp. Act authorizes
a corporation to operate without a board of directors, i.e., by shareholder action. REVISED
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.01(c) (1984).
61. See, e.g., Donahue, 367 Mass. at 586-87, 328 N.E.2d at 512; Kruger v. Gerth, 16
N.Y.2d 802, 805, 210 N.E.2d 355, 356, 263 N.Y.S.2d I, 3 (1965) (Desmond, c.J.,
dissenting).
62. See Donahue, 367 Mass. at 591-92, 328 N.E.2d at 514-15.

63.

Id.
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a variety of problems which may be raised by pursuing the statutory
alternatives offered to date in response to that threat.
The approach advocated by the Corporate Governance Project,
and the one being urged by this author for consideration by state legis
lators, is based upon a belief that a more reasonable balance between
the concerns of directors and the rights of shareholders can be
achieved, as opposed to simply insulating directors from all liability
for breach of duty of care. That balance can be achieved by providing
a statutory cap on liability for corporate officials reasonably related to
the economic benefits received by those persons from the corporation
they serve. Were that approach to be followed, the state corporation
law would provide that the maximum liability which an officer or di
rector would have for breach of the duty of care would be measured by
the amount of compensation or fees that person had received from the
corporation over a specified period of time.64
Such an approach would offer shareholders a process by which to
hold corporate officials accountable when the latters' acts, by virtue of
their failure to exercise due care, had caused or allowed injury to the
corporation to result. Yet, at the same time, the ceiling limitation
would protect those corporate officials from the horrendously dispro
portionate exposure to liability which presently exists. With specific
estimates of the maximum liability to which officers and directors
would be exposed then possible, D & 0 coverage should be more rea
sonably affordable. 6s
The specific amount of any such cap obviously is somewhat arbi
trary because, in any given instance, the amount of the ceiling will
have no direct relationship to the harm suffered by the corporation. 66
From the standpoint of restoring a corporation to the position it
64. For a description of how § 7.17 of the Corporate Governance Project would op
erate, see supra note 15 and accompanying text. The author of Note, The Limitation of
Directors'Liability, supra note 1, proposes a similar approach, setting a floor of $100,000.00
for outside directors and the annual compensation received in their officer capacity for
inside directors. Id. at 449-51.
65. Corporate Governance Project, T.D. 7, supra note 6, at 31-32.
66. To the extent that the mere existence of a cap in fact influences directors' con
duct in a manner which promotes accountability, the arbitrariness of any specific cap
amount is less relevant. Measuring the amount of such a cap by reference to the amount of
compensation received by the corporate official over an identified period actually is not all
that arbitrary. With a restitution-based measure of damages, the party who has acted
wrongfully forfeits his or her rights to compensation and whatever profits may have been
obtained. The Corporate Governance Project justifies this as consistent with general
agency law cases and principles. Id. at 39. Traditional tort liability concepts, on the other
.hand, would suggest awarding a victorious corporation in a derivative action damages for
the full extent of injuries suffered. Id. at 30.
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would have been in had a particular transaction not been pursued, this
remedy generally will be inadequate. Nevertheless, to the extent that
the existence of some residual liability can have an impact in monitor
ing and influencing directors' and officers' conduct, a liability cap
would appear worth pursuing. It has been surprising that so few cor
porate law practitioners have urged this alternative approach in the
legislative debates that have occurred to date. Perhaps this is attribu
table to the fact that most practitioners who represent corporations
identify their client as the incumbent management or the board of di
rectors rather than the ultimate owners, the shareholders.67
Some commentators suggest that a statutory ceiling approach
may be constitutionally infirm.68 Various liability caps enacted by
state legislatures in other contexts have been challenged on the ground
that those limitations violate, among other constitutional provisions,
the seventh amendment to the Constitution and the comparable state
constitutional protections regarding the basic right to a jury trial.69
This writer believes, however, that a liability cap in the area of officers'
and directors' liability can withstand a constitutional challenge if ap
propriately enacted.
While several constitutional law issues have been raised with re
spect to statutory limitation of damages in a variety of areas, the prin
cipal challenge has been the right to a jury trial on the subject of
damages. The principal grouping of cases which have questioned the
constitutionality of ceilings on liability has dealt with various state leg
islative efforts to impose caps on malpractice liability or non-economic
damages with respect to recognized common law causes of action.70
Among the more recent decisions invalidating a statutory cap on med
ical malpractice awards is that in Boyd v. Bulala,71 where Federal Dis
trict Judge Michael found that the $750,000.00 cap enacted by the
Virginia legislature violated the plaintiff's constitutional right to a jury
67. It was instructive to this writer to hear one of the principal speakers, a highly
regarded corporate practitioner, at the Corporation Law Section's special program during
the Connecticut Bar Association's 1987 Annual Meeting, claim that corporate lawyers had
an obligation to their clients, the members of a corporation's board of directors, to support
the legislative approach offering maximum exculpation from liability, i.e., the Indiana ap
proach. Nothing in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, however, mandates such a
conclusion. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuer, §§ 1.7, 1.13 (1983).
68. See, e.g., Hanks, supra note I, at 30; Hazen, supra note I, at 173.
69. See, e.g., Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986); Jones v. State Bd. of
Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); White V.
State, 203 Mont. 363, 661 P.2d 1272 (1983); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d
825 (1980).
70. For case citations, see supra note 69.
71. 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986).
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trial under both the United States and Virginia constitutions. That
case is of special interest because of its potential bearing on the statu
tory cap provision enacted in Virginia with respect to the limitation of
directors' liability for breach of the duty of care. 72
The plaintiff actually challenged the constitutionality of the mal
practice award cap on three independent constitutional law grounds
as a denial of equal protection, as violative of the plaintiff's due pro
cess rights, and as violative of the plaintiff's constitutional right to a
trial by juryJ3 While Judge Michael held that the statutory cap did
not violate the equal protection and due process clauses,74 he did find
that the cap violated the plaintiff's seventh amendment right to a jury
trial since, as drafted, the malpractice damages cap "infringes strongly
on the fact-finding function of the jury in assessing appropriate dam
ages."7S A key inquiry thus was whether the determination of dam
ages should be classified as a fundamental jury function. 76 Judge
Michael concluded that the assessment of the full measure of dan:tages
always had been regarded as within the scope of the jury's basic
functions. 77
At first blush, all of Judge Michael's reasoning in that case would
appear to be equally applicable both to the statutory cap reflected in
the Virginia approach and to a ceiling of the type proposed by section
7.17 of the ALI Corporate Governance Project. A shareholder's right
to sue for a corporate official's breach of the duty of care has long been
recognized. 78 Although the shareholders' derivative action has been
categorized as a combination of actions at law and equity, the
Supreme Court clearly held in Ross v. Bernhard 79 that plaintiffs in
such an action are entitled to the right to a jury trial. 80
72. For text and discussion of the Virginia statute, see supra notes 10 and 11 and
accompanying text.
73. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 785.
74. Id. at 787-88.
75. Id. at 788-89.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 789.
78. Many corporation statutes, in fact, are silent on both the duty of care which a
director must exercise and a shareholder's right to sue on behalf of the corporation to
enforce such a duty. See, e.g., Conn. Stock Corporation Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 33-282 to 418 (West 1987 & Supp. 1988).
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 eliminating the
distinctions between actions at law and equity, the corporation's right to recover against
corporate officials was recognized at law, but a shareholder's right to bring such an action
on behalf of the corporation was recognized only in equity. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 u.S.
531, 536-37 (1970).
79. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
80. Id. at 536.
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At least two responses can be offered why a statutory limitation
in the case of directors' liability should be constitutionally permissible,
notwithstanding the Boyd v. Bulala analysis. The Reporter responsi
ble for drafting section 7.17 of the Corporate Governance Project cites
a variety of additional state court holdings 81 to support his view that
"a reasonable limitation on the liability of directors and officers should
encounter no serious constitutional obstacle."82 The limitation pro
posed in section 7.17 apparently is viewed as a reasonable, rather than
an arbitrary, limitation, both because it is directly related to the eco
nomic benefits received by whomever may be the particular defendants
and because, in shareholder derivative actions, individual shareholders
are not seeking direct recovery for serious personal injuries or dam
ages, but rather on behalf of the corporation as an entity. 83
While these arguments may be sufficient to dispose of any consti
tutional law challenge, this author would respond to any prospective
challenge by an alternative means-first, by requiring that any statu
tory cap provision be approved by the requisite vote of the sharehold
ers of that corporation, and, second, by expressly providing in the
amendment or the related disclosures furnished to shareholders that
such approval represents a decision by the shareholders to waive their
right to a jury trial on the full measure of damages otherwise available
in the absence of a cap.
The nature of the derivative action which has been the focal point
for all the discussion is one dependent totally upon the shareholder
status of the persons involved. In other words, no one has a right to
bring any action on the corporation's behalf against the officers or di
rectors of the corporation except by having met certain shareholder
qualifications.84
Furthermore, the corporation law statutes long have provided for
81. Included are Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1,271 N.E.2d 592 (1971); Johnson v.
St. Vincent Hosp. Inc., 273 Ind. 374,404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Fein v. Permanente Medical
Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137,695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985). Corporate Governance
Project, T.D. 7, supra note 6, at 62. See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env'tl. Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Pioneer Federal Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Reeder, 474 So. 2d
783 (Fla. 1985); Cory v. Shierloh, 29 Cal. 3d, 629 P.2d 8, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1981); and
State ex reI. Strykowski, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
82. Corporate Governance Project, T.D. 7, supra note 6, at 62.
83. As to any recovery in a derivative action being for the benefit only of the corpora
tion, see Ross, 396 U.S. at 538; Koster v. Lumberman's Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518,
.522 (1947).
84. Thus, for example, the Revised Model Business Corporations Act requires that a
person bringing a derivative action: (1) be a shareholder at the time of transaction com
plained of; and (2) make a demand upon the Board of Directors to obtain action (or allege
sufficient facts to state why such demand is excused). See REV. MODEL BUSINESS CoRP.
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shareholder voting on various corporate matters by a certain percent
age of the outstanding shares. 8s Typically, so long as the requisite per
centage of affirmative votes-either a majority or two-thirds of the
voting power represented-is obtained, all shareholders thereafter are
bound by that vote. 86 There is nothing preposterous or inconsistent in
applying that well-known concept to a shareholder vote to approve a
statutory ceiling on the liability of corporate officials. Moreover, if
shareholders have the authority to vote to eliminate officer and direc
tor liability altogether, as contemplated, for example, under both the
Delaware and Virginia approaches, how can they not also approve a
statutory ceiling on liability, a lesser reduction of their otherwise rec
ognized right?87
Most decisions which have involved a waiver of constitutional
rights relate to criminal or other matters involving individual defend
ants. 88 Nevertheless, the teaching of those cases is that such a waiver
is possible, particularly if the waiver is an informed one. 89 An amend
ment to a publicly-held corporation's certificate of incorporation limit
ing the amount of damages recoverable in an action for breach of duty
of care that has to be submitted to shareholders for action will trigger
the production of a proxy statement describing the consequences of
adoption or rejection of the amendment. 90 Shareholder approval thus
cannot be given without adequate information having been disclosed
in advance of the shareholder vote. A similar requirement could be
ACT § 1.40 (1984). Other states add additional requirements, e.g., that the shareholder put
up security for expenses. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 621 (McKinney 1986).
85. See, e.g., the following statutory material regarding merger and sale of assets
transactions: REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 11.03, 12.01 (1984); DEL. CoDE
ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251, 271 (1983 & Supp. 1988); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B §§ 15, 78 (Law
Co-op 1979 & Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-366, 33-372 (West 1987).
86. The typical effect given to shareholder action which obtains the requisite vote is
as expressed in Rev. Model Business Corp. Act § 11.05, which provides as follows:
(a) After a plan of merger ... is approved by the shareholders ... the
surviving or acquiring corporation shall deliver to the secretary of state for filing
articles of merger . . ..
(b) Unless a delayed effective date is specified, a merger ... takes effect
when the articles of merger ... are filed.
REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 11.05 (1984).
81. At least one judge has disagreed with the concept that the power to deal exhaus
tively with the whole inherently includes the power to deal with a lesser portion thereof.
See Judge Michael's opinion in Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781,789-90 (W.D. Va. 1986).
88. See, e.g., the lengthy annotation of cases in Annotations, Withdrawal or Disre
gard of Waiver of Jury Trial in Civil Action, 64 A.L.R.2d 506 (1959).
89. Id.
90. See Item 19 of Regulation 14A (calling for mandatory disclosure of "the reasons
for and the general effect of" any charter or by-law amendment being submitted for share
holder action.) 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14a-101 (Schedule 14A, Item 19) (1988).
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included in the applicable state corporation statutes with respect to
smaller closely-held corporations not subject to the federal proxy
rules. 91 In short, it should be possible to structure a required share
holder approval which would avoid any basis for challenge on consti
tutional law grounds ..
CONCLUSION

The support urged in this commentary for the Corporate Govern
ance Project's "middle ground" response is rooted in a belief that it is
possible both to afford corporate officials substantial relief from other
wise unreasonable exposure to financial liability and, at the same time,
preserve some meaningful accountability for the actions of corporate
officials to the shareholders. As noted earlier, a ceiling related to the
economic benefits realized by the corporate official will achieve all the
desired objectives involved in limiting liability-avoiding dispropor
tionate, excessive or Draconian damages, reducing pressures on corpo
rate officials to act in an unduly risk-averse manner, and reducing the
costs of D & 0 insurance coverage for corporate officials-while at the
same time retaining some accountability on the part of corporate offi
cials through the prospect of a minimal residual liability for due care
violations. While the deterrent effect of derivative litigation unques
tionably will be reduced with a statutory limitation on due care liabil
ity, the potential threat of such litigation nevertheless should continue
to exert an influence in pronioting prudent actions by corporate offi
cials. That residual potential, coupled with the impact of other devel
opments such as the presence on a board of directors of a majority of
independent directors, securities disclosure requirements, and the mar
ket discipline imposed by the possibility of hostile takeover bids,
should assure an adequate minimum level of corporate accountability.
The total elimination of financial liability contemplated by the In
diana approach (and, as a practical matter, the other statutory ap
91. Thus, for example, a typical "books and records" provision of a corporation stat
ute (see, for example, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-307 (West 1987» could be amended
by adding something like the following:
Each corporation, other than a corporation subject to Section 14 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 as amended, seeking shareholder approval of an amend
ment to its certificate of corporation with respect to the limitation of liability of
directors, corporate officers or agents for breach of duty to the corporation, shall
furnish to the applicable shareholders of record a brief statement describing the
reason for and general effect of the proposed amendment.
In any given instance, the specific disclosures made by the corporation describing the
"general effect" of the proposed cap would include an express statement that approval by
shareholders represents a decision to waive rights to a jury trial as to damages.
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proaches) swings the pendulum further than necessary to afford
corporate officials the basic protection they desire and need. In the
absence of any residual financial liability exposure, the duty of care
provisions of state corporation law would fail to have any meaningful
significance or function. With a remedy for due care violations that
measures the maximum exposure by the economic benefits received by
the delinquent corporate officials, the applicable duty of care standards
of the state corporation law statutes will retain both some credibility
and operative deterrent impact.
The state legislatures which either have acted or are considering
legislation to absolve directors of all financial exposure-which in
clude Connecticut, Massachusetts and New York in the Northeast
have been persuaded to adopt too extreme a response. It is time for
those states to reexamine the issues involved more closely and to ad
dress the concerns of both corporate officials and shareholders in a
fairer and more balanced manner.

